Former Ottomans in the ranks: pro-Entente military recruitment among Syrians in the Americas, 1916–18 by Stacy Fahrenthold
Journal of Global History
http://journals.cambridge.org/JGH
Additional services for Journal of Global History:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Former Ottomans in the ranks: pro-Entente military recruitment among Syrians in
the Americas, 1916–18
Stacy D. Fahrenthold
Journal of Global History / Volume 11 / Issue 01 / March 2016, pp 88 - 112
DOI: 10.1017/S1740022815000364, Published online: 08 February 2016
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1740022815000364
How to cite this article:
Stacy D. Fahrenthold (2016). Former Ottomans in the ranks: pro-Entente military recruitment
among Syrians in the Americas, 1916–18. Journal of Global History, 11, pp 88-112 doi:10.1017/
S1740022815000364
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JGH, IP address: 74.92.140.241 on 15 Mar 2016
Former Ottomans in the ranks:
pro-Entente military recruitment
among Syrians in the Americas,
1916–18*
Stacy D. Fahrenthold
Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA
E-mail: fahrenthold.s@gmail.com
Abstract
For half a million ‘Syrian’ Ottoman subjects living outside the empire, the First World War
initiated a massive political rift with Istanbul. Beginning in 1916, Syrian and Lebanese
emigrants from both North and South America sought to enlist, recruit, and conscript
immigrant men into the militaries of the Entente. Employing press items, correspondence, and
memoirs written by émigré recruiters during the war, this article reconstructs the transnational
networks that facilitated the voluntary enlistment of an estimated 10,000 Syrian emigrants
into the armies of the Entente, particularly the United States Army after 1917. As Ottoman
nationals, many Syrian recruits used this as a practical means of obtaining American citizen-
ship and shedding their legal ties to Istanbul. Émigré recruiters folded their military service into
broader goals for ‘Syrian’ and ‘Lebanese’ national liberation under the auspices of American
political support.
Keywords First World War, Lebanon, mobilization, Syria, transnationalism
Is it often said that the First World War was a time of unprecedented military mobilization.
Between 1914 and 1918, empires around the world imposed powers of conscription on their
subjects while also placing new demands on civilian life to make provision for total war. In the
Ottoman empire, these pressures produced some of the highest mortality rates seen beyond the
battleﬁeld: of the 2.8 million troops in the Ottoman army, an estimated 400,000 perished not
in combat but because of insufﬁcient provisioning and disease.1 Poor conditions and rumours
* I would like to thank Devi Mays, Akram Khater, Beth Baron, Chris Rominger, and a supportive audience at
North Carolina State University’s Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies for their critical insights
made on early drafts of this work.My further gratitude goes to the editors at the Journal of Global History and
two anonymous reviewers for their valuable commentary. The National Endowment for the Humanities 2014
Summer Seminar ‘World War I in the Middle East’ provided valuable research support.
1 Mehmet Beşikçi, The Ottoman mobilization of manpower in World War I: between volunteerism and
resistance, Leiden: Brill, 2012, p. 261.
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of starving soldiers checked efforts by Ottoman Syria’s governor-general, Cemal Pasha, to
impose universal conscription on the Empire’s Arab subjects (seferberlik), at the very moment
when his government’s dependence on the Arab home front reached its apogee.2 The empire
faced whatMehmet Beşikçi calls the ‘total war paradox’: Istanbul’s manpower needs depended
on its ability to ensure civilian compliance, but its inability to secure adequate food, clothing,
medicine, and munitions fed a growing manpower deﬁcit, producing an army desertion rate
that reached 17% by 1918.3
In Ottoman Syria and Mount Lebanon, draft evasion was a common response to these
pressures, but those who escaped fared no better than their conscripted countrymen. Ottoman
requisitions of crops and supplies combined with a succession of poor harvests, locusts, and an
Allied blockade to produce a devastating famine that killed 18% of western Syria’s population
by the war’s end.4 Syrians with the means to do so ﬂed abroad, joining emigrant communities
where half a million Ottoman subjects (representing 20% of the empire’s Arab subjects) had
lived since the turn of the century.5 By 1914, Syrian ‘colonies’ (jaliyyat) emerged in Egypt,West
Africa, Europe, the Philippines, and Australia, but the diaspora’s largest outposts were close to
the coasts of the Atlantic in North and South America.6 Syrians living in São Paulo, Buenos
Aires, and New York City may have been spared the war’s harsher indignities but they were
not entirely removed from its political pressures. The Ottoman government’s inability to end
the famine frustrated Syrians abroad, and Cemal Pasha’s 1916 execution of Arabist dissenters
compounded this anger, convincing activists that the homeland must be liberated from the
‘Turkish yoke’ (nir al-atrak) entirely. Ironically, those hanged in Syria in 1916 were not
revolutionaries but advocates of imperial reform; news of their deaths prompted unprece-
dented efforts by Syrians abroad to demand independence for Syria and Mount Lebanon, and
to promote revolt against Istanbul.7 The world war presented these activists with an oppor-
tunity for accomplishing national liberation.
In 1916, the Syrian diaspora transformed into a space for opposition against the
Ottoman state, the circulation of revolutionary propaganda and for collaboration with
the Entente powers. This article examines the diaspora’s experience with military mobilization,
documenting the recruitment of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants from the Americas into the
2 M. Talha Çiçek, War and state formation in Syria: Cemal Pasha’s governorate during World War I,
New York: Routledge, 2014.
3 Beşikçi, Ottoman mobilization, p. 7, 251.
4 Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial citizens: republican rights, paternal privilege, and gender in French Syria and
Lebanon, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 20–1; Melanie Schulze Tanielian, ‘Feeding the city: the
Beirut municipality and the politics of food duringWorldWar I’, International Journal ofMiddle East Studies,
46, 4, 2014, pp. 737–58.
5 Charles Issawi, ‘The historical background of Lebanese emigration, 1800–1914’, in Albert Hourani and Nadim
Shehadi, eds., Lebanese in the world: a century of emigration, London: I.B. Tauris and Centre for Lebanese
Studies, 1992, p. 31; Kemal Karpat, ‘The Ottoman emigration to America, 1860–1914’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 17, 2, 1985, pp. 175–209.
6 See Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725–1975, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985; Andrew Arsan, Interlopers of
empire: the Lebanese diaspora in colonial French West Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014;
William Gervase Clarence-Smith, ‘Middle Eastern migrants in the Philippines: entrepreneurs and cultural
brokers’,Asian Journal of Social Science, 32, 3, 2004, 425–57; AnneMonsour,Not quite white: Lebanese and
the white Australia policy, Brisbane: Post Pressed, 2010; John Toﬁk Karam, Another arabesque: Syrian–
Lebanese ethnicity in neoliberal Brazil, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2007; Akram Khater,
Inventing home: emigration, gender, and the middle class in Lebanon, 1870–1920, Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 2001.
7 Çiçek, War and state formation, pp. 39–76; Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism,
and Islamism in the Ottoman empire, 1908–1918, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997,
pp. 193–6.
R E C R U I T M E N T A M O N G S Y R I A N S I N T H E A M E R I C A S , 1 9 1 6 – 1 8 j8 9
French, Canadian, and American armies. Émigré activists promoted enlistment with the
Entente as a means of accomplishing Syria’s independence from the Ottomans. And enlist they
did: an estimated 10,000 ethnic Syrians had joined the United States army by 1918, many of
them former Ottoman nationals.8 Smaller numbers of Syrians also volunteered for the French-
led Légion d’Orient and the Canadian Expeditionary Forces.9
Syrian émigré recruiters presided over a transnational, largely clandestine mobilization
project that produced a lateral trafﬁc in volunteers between immigrant communities in the
United States, Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere in the Americas. The soldiers whom they raised
navigated a complicated legal terrain between the Ottomans and the Entente, and they
depended on a sophisticated network of recruiters to help them acquire the new passports,
visas, and naturalization documents they needed to enlist. Recruiters mediated between foreign
governments and a growing pool of Syrian migrants to exact favourable terms for their men.
Syrians living in the diaspora widely saw military service as a practical means of achieving a
post-Ottoman nationality status, particularly after the United States entered the war on 6 April
1917 and extended citizenship rights to foreign-born volunteers the following year. Syrian men
who deployed (almost always to European, not Ottoman, fronts) described their status as a
partnership with America ﬁghting for Syrian liberation. Theirs was a multi-layered and ﬂexible
patriotism that allowed soldiers to become ‘Syrian’ and ‘American’ simultaneously through
service and action.10
The enlistment of Syrian migrants required a signiﬁcant amount of work: medical testing,
the provision of new travel documentation, and often changes in nationality to ensure the
process’s legality. Each facet brought recruiters into close relationships with foreign govern-
ment ofﬁcials, most notably the French Foreign Ministry and (in 1917) the US Department of
State. At the same time, the Syrian agents who managed the process of recruiting, screening,
and transporting new volunteers to enlistment sites worked clandestinely, in liminal legal
spaces that the Entente powers informally sanctioned but did not oversee. Consequently,
examining Syrian enlistment practices requires investigating the correspondence, press
clippings, and memoirs of individual recruiters, soldiers, and their agents, most of whom
worked beyond the archival conﬁnes of the state. Employing these materials, this article tracks
the movement of Arabophone Ottoman emigrants from Greater Syria (including Mount
Lebanon and Palestine) into military collaboration with the Entente. The recruiters and
soldiers discussed here belonged to one of four groups: Ottoman nationals in diaspora, ‘Syrian’
8 Precise Syrian numbers are difﬁcult to come by. Contemporary sources report that 12,000 to 15,000 Syrians
served in the US army, a ﬁgure that is almost certainly too high. See JohnMoroso, ‘Fall of Damascus thrills our
Syrians’,New York Times, 6 October 1918, p. 48; US National Archives and Records Administration, Record
Group 59, Records of the State Department relating to World War I and its termination (henceforth NARA,
RG 59), M367, roll 392, 763.72119/3456, George Khairallah to Frank Polk, State Department, 15 January
1919, p. 2. See also NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 392, 763.72119/4555, Hampson Gary to Robert Lansing,
‘Transmitting a memorandum called “America and Syria”’, 27 February 1919, pp. 5–6. In 1924, Philip Hitti
enumerated 13,965 enlistments in his study, The Syrians in America, New York: G.H. Doran, 1924, p. 102.
SarahGualtieri points out differences betweenHitti’s ﬁgure and rates as high as 15,000 described by the Syrian
American Club (in writings by one of its members, George Khairallah). Comparisons with Selective Service
records, the Naturalization Index, and Army cards suggest that closer to 10,000 Syrian immigrants served at
least one enlistment term. Sarah Gualtieri, Between Arab and white: race and ethnicity in the early Syrian
American diaspora, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009, p. 210, n.18.
9 Gabriel Ilyas Ward, Kitab al-Jundi al-Suri ﬁ-Thalatha Hurub (The Syrian soldier in three wars), New York:
al-Matbaʿa al-Tijariyya al-Suriyya al-Amrikiyya, 1919, p. 72.
10 Akram Fouad Khater, ‘Becoming “Syrian” in America: a global geography of ethnicity and nation’,Diaspora:
Journal of Transnational Studies, 14, 2/3, 2005, pp. 299–300.
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foreign residents in the Americas with incomplete naturalization status, naturalized Syrian
Americans, and second-generation Syrian Americans born abroad. Where Syrian volunteers
fell on this scale bore consequences for their ability to enlist, creating obstacles that recruiters
confronted on a case-by-case basis.
These recruiters promoted Syrian participation in Allied efforts in the belief that the war
would liberate their Middle Eastern homeland from Ottoman rule, an idea deployed similarly
by British, French, and American policymakers.11 Although such sentiments would later be
touted as evidence of an authentic nationalist spirit in the diaspora, the reality was that this
wartime activism was neither purely sentimental nor entirely nationalist in content.
Military mobilization was a political act that recruiters linked closely with ideas about
Syria’s liberation from the Ottoman government. It was not just about patriotic sentiment,
longing, or an emotional connection to the homeland, however, but about the deﬁnitive action
they inspired.12 This distinction is important because, by casting new patriotic responsibilities
upon emigrant men on behalf of ‘martyred Syria’, recruiters did not merely ‘imagine’ the
existence of a Syrian (as opposed to an Ottoman) national community.13 Rather, they worked
towards Syria’s armed reclamation from Istanbul and used the enlistment campaign to build
partnerships with foreign governments to enforce it. These were not Syrian exiles engaged in
collective nostalgia; they were Syrians abroad, dynamic participants in a transnational politics
that joined Syria to its diaspora, the Mashriq to the mahjar, and which outlived the 1918
armistice.
Working with the Entente placed Syrian recruiters and soldiers alike into a difﬁcult,
unsettled legal space between the Ottoman empire and its enemies. Whether these men would
be remembered as patriots or traitors depended largely on the war’s outcome, and Ottoman
nationals ﬁghting for the Allies risked the possibility of statelessness as thanks for their efforts.
The French, Canadian, and American governments all readily offered travel documents to their
foreign volunteers, but concerns about ﬁghters’ nationality status lingered until the United
States offered them unfettered access to US citizenship in 1918. As shall be seen, a documentary
hierarchy emerged among recruiters as they promoted service with America as a means of
shedding one’s Ottoman nationality.14
Recruiters helped enlistees obtain passports and documentation to distance themselves
from the Ottoman empire, which formally claimed them as subjects, but Syrian emigrants also
expressed fears that joining the military would open them up to prosecution by Turkish
authorities. On the one hand lay charges of treachery; on the other, American nativist
accusations of immigrant cowardice, ‘slackerism’, or disloyalty. Syrian enlistees faced a
11 James Renton, ‘Changing languages of empire and the Orient: Britain and the invention of the Middle East,
1917–18’, Historical Journal, 50, 3, 2007, pp. 645–70.
12 Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron,Georges woke up laughing: long-distance nationalism and the search
for home, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001, p. 20;Manu Goswami, ‘Rethinking the modular nation
form: toward a sociohistorical conception of nationalism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44, 4,
2002, pp. 77–9; Isa Blumi, Ottoman refugees 1878–1939: migration in a post-imperial world, London:
Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 79–82.
13 NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 394, 763.72119/3841, New Syrian National League/Syrian American Club joint
telegram to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, 23 February 1919; Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities:
reﬂections on the origins and spread of nationalism, London: Verso, 1992.
14 Will Hanley, ‘Papers for going, papers for staying: identiﬁcation and subject formation in the eastern
Mediterranean’, in Liat Kozma, Cyrus Schayegh, and Avner Wishnitzer, eds., A global Middle East: mobility,
materiality, and culture in the modern age, London: I.B. Tauris, 2014, pp. 190–2; John C. Torpey, The
invention of the passport: surveillance, citizenship, and the state, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
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difﬁcult legal quandary, which one prominent recruiter described as being caught ‘between
treason and cowardice’ (bayna al-khiyana wa-l-jabana): simultaneously compelled and for-
bidden to join the ﬁght, many remained in a liminal station between Ottoman and American
citizenships, fuelling wider conversations about political belonging in the diaspora.15 As Syrian
American troops were shipped abroad in 1918, the Syrian press published soldiers’ images,
biographies, and letters home, using them as material evidence of their patriotism and of the
diaspora’s political contract with the Entente. Nationalist political parties used the soldiers as
symbols, folding them into Wilsonian narratives about self-determination through service and
action. The connection between soldiering and nationalism persisted through to the 1918
armistice, but Syrian American troops also objected to political uses of their personal legacy.
‘Saving the East from the claws of barbarism:’ the French
Légion d’Orient as precursor16
The Syrian diaspora’s experience with pro-Entente mobilization began in 1916, with the for-
mation of a French irregular corps called the Légion d’Orient. A mixed infantry regiment
comprised largely of Armenians (who numbered around 4,000) under French ofﬁcers, the
Légion d’Orient employed 550 Syrian and Lebanese emigrants recruited from Egypt, Europe,
and the Americas.17 In the Americas, ethnic fraternal societies promoted French war aims,
identiﬁed new recruits, and sponsored their passage to France’s enlistment sites in Bordeaux,
Marseille, and Le Havre.18 The employment of Syrian irregulars dovetailed with a much larger
French usage of colonial troops in combat, but the Légion d’Orient was not a unilaterally
French project.19 Simon Jackson argues that, for Syrian leaders in France and the Americas,
‘the war presented an opportunity to advance a variety of simmering plans for the geopolitical
future of the post-Ottoman Middle East’ and they aggressively lobbied the corps.20 Though
nominal in size, its value was touted by the French Foreign Minister, Georges-Picot, as a
symbolic manifestation of Syrian collaboration and support for France’s Levantine
ambitions.21 The Légion d’Orient was deployed to Palestine in 1917, where it helped British
forces under Edmund Allenby to secure Nablus for the allies.22
Syrian recruiters in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Havana, and New York City
levied emigrant men for the Légion d’Orient between late 1916 and 1917. The Paris-based
Comité Central Syrien (CCS) under Shukri Ghanim and Georges Samné led the effort, and, as a
result, historians have understood the project as an extension of the CCS’s pan-Syrian
15 Naʿum Mukarzil, ‘Fi kull yawm khitab (Every day, a speech)’, al-Huda, 7 June 1917, p. 2.
16 Shukri Bakhash, ‘Bayna al-Midhwad wa-l-Khandaq (Among troughs and trenches)’, al-Fatat, 22 December
1917, p. 1.
17 Eliezer Tauber, ‘La Légion d’Orient et la Légion arabe’,Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer, 81, 303, 1994,
p. 172.
18 Ibid., pp. 172–4.
19 Richard S. Fogarty, Race and war in France: colonial subjects in the French army, 1914–1918, Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008; GregoryMann,Native sons: West African veterans and France in
the twentieth century, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.
20 Simon Jackson, ‘Global recruitment: the wartime origins of French Mandate Syria’, in Alison Carrol and
Ludivine Brock, eds., France in the era of global war, 1914–1945: occupation, politics, empire, Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, p. 137; N. E. Bou-Nacklie, ‘Les Troupes Spéciales: religious and ethnic recruit-
ment, 1916–46’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25, 4, 1993, pp. 647–8.
21 Jackson, ‘Global recruitment’, p. 138. Tauber, ‘Légion d’Orient’, p. 174; Bou Nackhlie, ‘Troupes Spéciales’,
pp. 648–9.
22 Shukri Bakhash, ‘Nahu Suriya (About Syria)’, al-Fatat, 19 December 1917, p. 1.
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nationalist politics. Ghanim promoted Greater Syria’s separation from the Ottoman empire
and its placement under direct French tutelage in the name of national development.23
Although the CCS was perhaps the diaspora’s most popular nationalist movement during the
war, Ghanim’s inﬂuence waned swiftly in 1919 as France endorsed the creation of a Lebanese
state (the Grand Liban) at the expense of CCS demands for territorial unity.
Although the Légion d’Orient had been Ghanim’s idea, both ‘Syrianists’ and ‘Lebanists’
recruited for the corps and claimed the legionaries as symbols of their alliance with France.24
Indeed, the diaspora’s most successful recruiters did not share Ghanim’s politics: in New York
City, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, a political party called the Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lub-
naniyya (the Lebanon League of Progress) provided most of the Légion d’Orient’s recruitment
services (see Figure 1).25 Like the CCS, the Lebanon League endorsed French tutelage, but they
also lobbied for the creation of a Lebanese state distinct from Syria. The party’s leaders, the
prominent Lebanists Naʿum Mukarzil in New York City and Shukri al-Khuri in São Paulo,
worked with the CCS but otherwise described Ghanim as a political rival. Although trenchant
and intensifying ideological divisions between Syrianist and Lebanist leaders later boiled over
in 1918, the difﬁcult work of diasporic recruitment demanded that they collaborate, and they
did so on the shared, practical belief that ‘France will liberate [our] country and break the
heavy Turkish yoke that has treated us so severely, subjecting us to famine and starvation’.26
Mukarzil described mobilization as one half of a political contract he would later bring to the
Americans: manpower in return for partnership in homeland liberation. But, like the bound-
aries of the homeland itself, the ideological content of Syrian and Lebanese patriotism
remained less immediately relevant than the drive to build functional political alliances.
In the United States, Mukarzil’s Lebanon League of Progress raised US$100,000 to assist
emigrants in joining the Légion d’Orient in 1917; a large portion of this sum came from the
French government, according to Mukarzil (although he never disclosed how much).27 With
this funding, he presided over a new migration network linking his ofﬁce in Brooklyn to
recruiters working in São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Havana, andMérida, Mexico. Each city hosted
satellite chapters of the Lebanon League, which furnished recruits with French passports and
passage to New York City. After medical testing and vetting by Mukarzil, the men were given
steamship tickets to Bordeaux, where they formally enlisted in the French infantry.28 Syrian
volunteers from South America, the United States, and Canada made the lateral migration to
New York to participate inMukarzil’s campaign, facilitated in part by shipping lines managed
by Lebanon League partisans and Mukarzil’s relatives in South America.29
All of the work of vetting new soldiers was done in New York, save for the act of enlisting
itself, which happened upon arrival in France. Citing its own neutrality in the war, the
23 Andrew Arsan, ‘“This age is the age of associations”: committees, petitions, and the roots of interwar Middle
Eastern internationalism’, Journal of Global History, 7, 2, 2011, pp. 186–7; Simon Jackson, ‘Diaspora politics
and developmental empire: the Syro-Lebanese at the League of Nations’, Arab Studies Journal, 21, 1, 2013,
pp. 169–71.
24 This terminology is borrowed from Carol Hakim, The origins of the Lebanese national idea, 1840–1920,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013, pp. 217–20.
25 Eliezer Tauber, The Arab movements in World War I, London: Frank Cass, 1993, pp. 197–9.
26 Recruitment announcement, Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyya (Lebanon League of Progress), ‘Ila al-Watan
Yahama al-Watan (To the nation, to protect the nation)’, al-Huda, 1 May 1917, p. 4.
27 The French funded the CCS in Paris at similar levels: see Tauber, Arab movements, p. 209.
28 al-Nahda, ‘Ila al-Watan’, p. 4. The Lebanon League kept two doctors on retainer: Rashid Baddur and Najib
Barbur in New York.
29 Ibid., p. 4.
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US Department of State allowed the recruitment (but not the enlistment) of foreign troops on
its soil.30 The process’s piecemeal nature and its management by private émigré recruiters made
New York City a locus for the diaspora’s mobilization, but it also created opportunities for enter-
prisingmigrants seeking free passage across the Americas or to Europe.31 Simon Jackson points out
that the Légion d’Orient suffered attrition as recruits occasionally deserted upon arrival in France.32
The Lebanon League of Progress printed daily calls for recruits in Mukarzil’s newspaper in
New York City, al-Huda (Guidance); similar announcements appeared in Abu al-Hawl
(The Sphinx), the party’s São Paulo organ. The call to arms placed emigrant soldiers within a
very speciﬁc political project:
For recruitment and jihad in the name of humanity. Pay heed, oh sons of Lebanon!
The Turks are dividing your land… it is our goal to expel the Turks from Syria, to cut
Figure 1. Lebanon League of Progress Executive Committee in São Paulo, 1914. President
Shukri al-Khuri appears in the window; Shukri Bakhash (who later became a rival recruiter
in New York) is in the front row, second from right. Source: Jamʿiyyat al-Nahda
al-Lubnaniyya pamphlet, 29 September 1914, p. 3.
30 NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 475, 763.72119/9557, Hugh Cleveland to Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State,
‘Reason for creation of Eastern Legion’, 10 March 1920, pp. 4–5.
31 Shukri Bakhash, ‘al-Wizarat al-Harbiyya al-Fransawiyya wa-l-Firq al-Sharqiyya (The French War Ministry
and the Légion d’Orient)’, al-Fatat 19 December 1917, p. 2.
32 Jackson, ‘Global recruitment’, p. 143.
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the cords from those gallows once looped over the heads of [Lebanon’s] men who
dared talk about independence, the honourable, intelligent effendis of the nation.
Oh sons of the nation, [we] advise you move to the places French soldiers are.
The Lebanon League of Progress is ready and prepared to help volunteers enlist, and to
dispatch them under the protections and liberties afforded to them by the government of
France.33
The Lebanon League managed a lateral trafﬁc in recruits moving across the Americas for
mobilization purposes. Even with the provision of passports, transatlantic passage, and
guaranteed diplomatic protections, the League’s return on recruitment was more trickle
than torrent. The Syrian legionaries never amounted to more than 550 in a predominantly
Armenian force.34
Several factors mitigated the campaign’s success. Critics pointed out that, although France
supplied foreign soldiers with passports, it did not offer them French citizenship or even per-
manent residency rights. Syrian troops were in a complicated legal position and those with
Ottoman nationality opened themselves up to possible treason charges. Deployed soldiers
wrote to al-Huda and tried to ‘address the concerns of Syrians who fear their legal attachments
to the Turks [and] of being potentially disgraced as traitors’ by arguing that holding French
passports would protect them from prosecution.35 At the same time, others feared (correctly)
that the Légion d’Orient would become a tool of French colonial policy aimed at exacerbating
new and painful divisions between Syrian Christians and Muslims.36
The perception that the Légion d’Orient served French colonial interests prompted some
Syrians to seek other means of enlistment. In New York City, a smaller stream of naturalized
Syrian Americans migrated further north to enlist with the Canadian Expeditionary Forces.
Canada prohibited Ottoman nationals from serving in its military but encouraged its own
Syrian immigrants to naturalize as Canadian citizens and join up. The Canadian Expeditionary
Forces also welcomed Syrian Americans into its ranks, encouraging those who had achieved
US citizenship or declared their intent to naturalize to enlist.37 In his memoirs published in
1919, an intelligence ofﬁcer named Gabriel Ilyas Ward (see Figure 2) recounted his own
enlistment experience. Originally from Tripoli, Ward moved to New York in the 1890s,
became a US citizen, and twice served in the US army, in the Philippines (1898) and in Mexico
(1912).38 He was working as a dry goods wholesaler between New York City and Nova Scotia
when the war broke out in 1914. Frustrated by American neutrality, Ward and several of his
business partners left the United States, enlisted inMontreal, and arrived at the French trenches
by early 1916.
Ward’s enlistment appears to have been the result of his spontaneous decision, but Canada
also hosted active recruitment centres managed by Syrian immigrants. From Montreal, the
recruiters Ilyas Yusuf and Shakir Karam advertised widely for new volunteers, targeting the
Arabic newspapers in New York City, where they competed with Mukarzil’s Francophile
33 al-Nahda, ‘Ila al-Watan’, p. 4.
34 Tauber, Arab movements, pp. 200–1.
35 Gabriel Ilyas Ward, ‘ʿar an la-Tasil damaʾuna illa ʿala khanja al-saffah (‘Shame that our blood does not ﬂow,
except from the Butcher’s [Cemal Pasha’s] dagger)’, al-Huda, 2 June 1917, p. 3.
36 Tauber, Arab movements, p. 211.
37 Ilyas Yusuf and Shakir Karam, ‘al-Suriyyun wa-l-khidma al-‘askariyya ﬁ-Kanada (The Syrians and Canadian
military service)’, al-Nasr, 18 January 1918, p. 3, translation of public address given on 3 November 1917.
38 Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, pp. 61–4.
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Lebanon League of Progress.39 In a 1917 letter in al-Bayan (The Declaration) addressed to the
Syrians of New York, Karam announced his partnership with British ofﬁcials to levy Syrian
volunteers on behalf of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces.40 The campaign particularly
encouraged Muslim volunteers. Though the recruitment of Syrians in the French and US
militaries was almost entirely limited to Christians, Karam passed along assurances from the
Canadian Minister of Justice, A. L. Newcombe, that his country ‘draws no legal distinction
between Christians and Muslims’ in matters of eligibility.41 Syrian volunteers made strategic
decisions when opting for military service within French or Canadian units, depending on an
Figure 2. Gabriel Ilyas Ward, 1919. Military intelligence ofﬁcer and recruiter, seated in proﬁle
to obscure his injuries. Source: AANM, ES, Syrian American Club of Boston Records, 1, 5.
39 Yusuf and Karam, ‘al-Suriyyun wa-l-khidma al-‘askariyya’, p. 3.
40 ‘al-Tajnid al-Inklizi huna (The British recruitment here)’, al-Bayan, 2 June 1917, p. 1.
41 Yusuf and Karam, ‘al-Suriyyun wa-l-khidma al-‘askariyya’, p. 3.
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amalgam of desires to work in service to French or British interests and more practical issues
such as the terms of service, quality of provisions, or pay. America’s entry into the war in 1917
largely frustrated both recruitment ﬂows in favour of entry into the US army, but small
numbers of Syrians continued to enlist with either French or Canadian units until 1918. Choice
of destination also inﬂuenced enlistees’ decisions: Syrians Americans ﬁghting for France could
opt for a front against the Ottomans, but those in American or Canadian units were limited to
the European theatre.
Although most of the Syrian diaspora’s recruiters stated their preference that Syrians
ﬁght against the Ottomans, the American option was particularly attractive to recruiters
of Lebanese and Arab nationalist persuasions alike. Mukarzil, for instance, recommended
the US army and the Légion d’Orient simultaneously until June 1917, but he became
particularly suspicious of the French legionaries after the CCS sent its own delegation to South
America. Dr Qaysar Lakah and Jamil Mardam Bey toured Brazil looking for new recruits,
but Mukarzil suspected that the tour was designed to undercut his own recruitment work
and to solidify the Légion d’Orient as a Syrianist project. In al-Huda, Mukarzil hastened to
support Syrian enlistment in the US army instead and even deployment to alternative
battleﬁelds:
This publication looks favourably on Syrian and Lebanese volunteerism for the home-
land’s recovery… but it also supports Syrian and Lebanese volunteers being deployed to
alternative fronts and battleﬁelds. If compelled to duty, we will report to the African
Sahara, the European trenches, or anywhere else, for we have one single purpose, and
that is to ﬁght until freedom (hurriyya) is victorious.42
al-Huda was not the only diasporic paper to endorse enlistment in the US military as an
alternative to the Légion d’Orient; New York’s growing community of Syrian and Arab
nationalists also did so, in a bid to build a partnership with Wilson’s America for their
respective movements. The most notable such group was the Syria–Mount Lebanon League of
Liberation (Lajna Tahrir Suriya wa-Lubnan) under Ayyub Tabet, Amin Rihani, and N. T.
Tadross. Shukri Bakhash (see Figure 3), the editor of al-Fatat newspaper, was the League of
Liberation’s primary recruiter.43
America’s Selective Service draft and legal ambiguities
surrounding Syrian immigrants
In April 1917, President WoodrowWilson committed his country to war and announced that
the United States would raise 4 million soldiers to join Allied troops on the Western Front.
Most of these troops were levied in the largest compulsory draft in American history: the
Selective Service draft of 1917. PresidentWilson’s commitment to ﬁghting ‘for the liberation of
nations and oppressed peoples around the world’ against ‘the spirit of autocracy that has
shattered the weak peoples under its yoke’ prompted Syrian immigrants to support the call to
arms and, over the course of the war, the president would become one of the most revered
42 ‘al-Khawatir: bayna al-harb wa-l-tard wa-l-sajn (Reﬂections: between war, expulsion, and imprisonment)’,
al-Huda, 3 May 1917, p. 5.
43 NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 381, 763.72119/1686, E. Tabet and Mikhail Naimy to President Wilson, 10May
1918, pp. 1–2.
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personalities for Syrian, Lebanese, and Arab nationalists alike.44 In the United States, the same
newspaper editors who endorsed America’s war effort also led the ﬁrst campaigns to enlist
Syrians in the army: Naʿum Mukarzil (al-Huda), Shukri Bakhash (al-Fatat (Youth)), Ibrahim
al-Khuri and Wadiʿ Shakir (Fatat Boston, al-Fatat’s sister publication), among others. Of
course, the draft’s implementation immediately raised questions about Syrian eligibility for
military service.While recruiters saw Syrian enlistment in the US army as a natural extension to
work already being done with America’s allies, the US Provost Marshal, Enoch Crowder, was
reticent about including Ottoman nationals in the army’s ranks. Could Syrian immigrants be
compelled to serve? What about those who retained their Ottoman nationality and were thus
neutral allies of America’s German enemy?
Like native-born American citizens, all foreign-born immigrants and foreign nationals
were required to register with the Selective Service boards, which then chose eligible men
Figure 3. Shukri Bakhash, editor of al-Fatat, 1917. A recruiter for the US army and a War
Department propagandist, Bakhash called his efforts a ‘literary jihad’ against the Ottoman
government. Source: Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 115.
44 Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 73; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian moment: self- determination and the origins
of anticolonial nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 23–55.
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for compulsory military service. Unnaturalized foreign-born registrants were classiﬁed in one
of three categories: declarant (having submitted a Declaration of Intent, the ﬁrst papers
required of immigrants seeking to naturalize), non-declarant (retaining a foreign nationality),
or enemy alien. Enemy aliens were, by virtue of international law, ineligible for the draft:
these men ‘would not be compelled to serve … since they would be in a position of ﬁghting
their own countrymen’.45 But the legal standing of Ottoman nationals remained particularly
murky, especially for Ottoman non-declarants. Because the United States never declared war
on the Ottoman empire, Ottoman subjects living in the country became ‘neutral allies of the
enemy’. Like enemy aliens, ‘neutral allies of the enemy’ could not be compelled to serve, but
they could volunteer or otherwise opt into service if mistakenly drafted. On the face of it,
this granted Ottoman immigrants a legal status distinct from that of German, Austrian, or
Czech immigrants.46 In practice, however, Syrian non-declarants were routinely dismissed
from the army, misclassiﬁed in draft documents as ‘alien enemies’ alongside other groups
of ineligible foreigners. This practice was so common that some Syrian draftees successfully
evaded the draft (or received early discharge from service) by invoking ‘alien enemy’ status.47
Such ambiguities surrounding the military eligibility of Ottoman immigrants worried Syrian
recruiters as they sought to widen (not contract) the pool of available troops.48
Not to be outdone by the draft’s classiﬁcation scheme, recruiters found room to
navigate the process and place men in the US army. A common strategy involved starting the
naturalization process just prior to enlistment. In al-Huda newspaper, Mukarzil reported
that, although all Syrian men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-one must register with
the Selective Service Board, only those bearing their ‘ﬁrst papers’ (that is, a Declaration of
Intent) would be eligible for voluntary induction. A recent court case, Dow vs. United
States (1915), had assured Syrian immigrants access to US citizenship. Mukarzil argued
that, by submitting their ﬁrst papers before registering with the Selective Service Board,
Syrian men would bolster their citizenship petitions by serving America as declarant
immigrants as opposed to ‘neutral allies of the enemy’. Citing new legislation which dis-
tinguished between ‘Lebanonites or Syrians claimed by Turkey as a subject’ and ethnic Turks,
he pointed out that military service was the ﬁrst step towards US citizenship. ‘The war has
prompted the American government to distinguish the Syrians and Lebanese from those who
are clearly Turks’, he admonished his readers.49 For Mukarzil, this was evidence that Amer-
icans saw Syrian and Lebanese aspirations for independence as legitimate and would
support them.
Mukarzil did not mention the religious connotations behind these labels in his editorial, but it
is worth noting that, in American legal parlance, the conﬂation of ‘Turk’ with Muslim and
‘Syrian’with Christian was never far from the surface. Another outcome ofDow v. United States
was the creation of a ‘Syrian’ ethnicity that was racially white, Christian, and eligible for
45 Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the operations of the Selective
Service system to December 20, 1918, Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1919, pp. 86–8.
46 Nancy Gentile Ford, Americans all! Foreign-born soldiers in World War I, College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press, 2001, pp. 60–1.
47 See, for instance, New York State Archives, Adjutant General’s ofﬁce, Abstracts of World War I military
service, 1917–1919, series B0808-85, draft cards for Alex Assa, service number 1929681, 25 September 1917,
and for Tauﬁk Hazaz, service number 3194840, 28 May 1918.
48 Naʿum Mukarzil, ‘al-Lubnaniyyun wa-l-Suriyyun tujaha al-khidma al-ʿaskariyya (The Lebanese and Syrians
facing military service)’, al-Huda, 1 June 1917, p. 3.
49 Ibid., p. 3.
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American citizenship on those bases.50 The wartime distinction between ‘Syrians’ and ‘Turks’
presented an extension of this logic, and it opened military service up to Arab Christian immi-
grants while offering them a means of establishing a post-Ottoman nationality status
and some recognition as simultaneously American and ‘Syrian’ (or ‘Lebanese’, as Mukarzil
insisted).
One signiﬁcant obstacle persisted: US immigration law required that all new declarants
reside in-country for ﬁve continuous years before applying for their ‘second papers’, the
petition for naturalization. Critically, Syrians who entered this waiting period formally
remained subjects of the Ottoman empire. In cases where Syrian declarants fought for the
American military, they risked statelessness or prosecution by the Ottoman government.
Concerned about the quandary, Mukarzil wrote to Crowder to inquire whether Syrian
volunteers could be excused from the ﬁve-year residency requirement; a system of sponsorship
could replace the waiting period, and naturalized Syrians could vouch for their compatriot
soldiers.51 Such a change, he argued, would transform Syrian soldiers into American citizens
overnight, mitigating legal problems arising from their option to serve.
The idea to offer citizenship to Syrian volunteers fell on deaf ears in 1917, and Provost
Marshall Crowder remained wary of the diplomatic issues that instant naturalization could
raise. In May 1918, the army would revise its enlistment policies in just this way, but until that
time the majority of Syrian volunteers levied were either second-generation Syrian Americans
(American citizens by virtue of birth) or long-time declarants who took the ﬁnal step to
naturalize as they joined the army. Recruiters for the Légion d’Orient and the US army com-
peted for immigrant attentions throughout 1917, and Mukarzil, Bakhash, and their partisans
ﬁltered manpower through US, French, and Canadian channels on the basis of citizenship
status and soldiers’ preferences about destination.
‘Every day, a speech:’ campaigns for emigrant
recruitment, 1917–1852
After PresidentWilson declared war, the Syrian diaspora hosted several mass recruitment fairs,
complete with public square meetings and bathed in a multivalent discourse about patriotism
with the feel of a carnival. In the United States, al-Huda, al-Fatat, and Fatat Boston newspapers
celebrated deployed soldiers, and fraternal organizations hosted festivals open to the com-
munity at large. At these meetings, token Syrian soldiers appeared in uniform and shared their
experiences with the crowd; the emigrant community’s rich supply of poets, playwrights, and
journalists followed up with speeches. The Lebanon League of Progress sponsored one such
rally in Boston in May 1917. Some 2,000 Syrian and Lebanese immigrants attended, among
them the rector of Brooklyn’s Our Lady of the Cedars Maronite Church, Joseph Yazbek, the
Syrian American Club (al-Muntada al-Suri al-Amriki) recruiter and Fatat Boston editor, Wadiʿ
Shakir, and the French consul, Joseph Flamand. The mass meeting featured speeches about
Syrians’ patriotic obligation ‘to enlist under the Stars and Stripes, and to ﬁght for the greatest
50 Gualtieri, Between Arab and white, pp. 58–61, 84.
51 Mukarzil, ‘al-Lubnaniyyun wa-l-Suriyyun’, p. 3.
52 Naʿum Mukarzil, ‘Fi kull yawm khitab’.
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democracy in the world’.53 One of the community’s enlisted men, Elias F. Shannon, appeared
in uniform and addressed other second-generation Syrians.54
The immigrant press cast Syrian recruitment in the language of patriotic duty, and other forms
of immigrant patriotism – reprinting of propaganda from the Committee for Public Information,
advertisements for Liberty Loans, and promotion of President Wilson’s war aims – appeared
alongside hagiographic accounts of Syrian soldiers. Next to enlistment in the army, purchasing
Liberty Loans was the best way to ‘prove that you are 100%American’, as a 1918 advertisement
in al-Nasr (The Eagle) newspaper put it.55 In New York City, Syrian immigrants raised US
$300,000 in Liberty Loans by October 1918; the Boston-based Syrian American Club raised
another US$18,750.56 ‘This organization is only as strong and radiant as its membership’, wrote
Mukarzil in June 1917, and ‘those of us who are strongmust use that strength in national service;
those who are not strong must inspire the mighty and powerful’.57
Syrian displays of pro-Entente patriotism signalled the community’s proud participation in
American political life, but they also included a second register, joining support for American
war aims with the liberation of the Syrian homeland. The Syrian community’s recruitment
campaigns employed the language of Wilsonian self-determination, and ‘establishing the right
of peoples to determine their future’ in Syria andMount Lebanon remained the primary goal.58
Enlisting in the US army on behalf of Syrians still ‘under the Turkish yoke’ became an explicitly
political act, reframing ‘Syrian’ (or ‘Lebanese’) identity into nationalist categories. In this sense,
military mobilization was one of the clearest ways that the emigrants (to borrow Akram
Khater’s phrasing) ‘became “Syrian” in America’ through service and action.59 In New York
City, the Lebanon League of Progress called young men to action as a matter of patriotism and
masculine duty.
Second-generation Syrian Americans played a unique role in soliciting manpower
from their communities. As American-born children with Syrian parents, these youngmen held
US citizenship by virtue of birth. Eager to boost its voluntary enlistment numbers, the army
sent these men back into their communities as recruiters before deploying them abroad.
One of these young men was twenty-three-year-old Albert Hatem (see Figure 4). In addition to
being the nephew of Naʿum Hatem (a respected Syrian American author in Brooklyn), Albert
was an heir of Haﬁd ʿId Hatem, a deputy in Mount Lebanon’s governing Administrative
Council before the war.60 With funds from the Lebanon League of Progress and the Syria–
Mount Lebanon League of Liberation, Hatem toured the southern United States in summer
1917, looking for recruits. He gave appearances in uniform with fellow soldiers Yusuf ʿAbdu,
Rashid Hajjar, and Ilyas Najmi, as well as Costa Najour and Dr Mitri Masʿud.61 At a Syrian
Greek Orthodox church in Atlanta, Hatem collected a dozen new men, all destined for the
53 ‘Syrians loyal to United States’, Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 1917, p. 9.
54 Ibid.; NARA, RG 29, T626, roll 957, Records of the Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United
States, 1930, Massachusetts Census of Populations, Suffolk County, Boston City, District 13-514, Ward 20,
page 9b, line 81, Elias Shannon.
55 Bilingual Liberty Loan advertisement, ‘La tathabbat marra wahida innaka Amriki bal miʾa marra / Prove you
are 100% American’, al-Nasr, 30 September 1918, p. 5.
56 Moroso, ‘Fall of Damascus’; Arab American National Museum, Dearborn, MI, Evelyn Shakir Collection
(henceforth AANM, ES), Syrian American Club of Boston Records, 1, 5.
57 Mukarzil, ‘Fi kull yawm khitab’.
58 ‘Asas manh al-shʿub huquq taqrir mustaqbaliha (The foundational rights of peoples to determine their
future)’, al-Huda, 2 June 1917, p. 2. See also Manela,Wilsonian moment, pp. 28–30.
59 Khater, ‘Becoming “Syrian”’, p. 300.
60 Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 11.
61 On Costa Najour, see Gualtieri, Between Arab and white, pp. 60–2.
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Western Front, including Tanyus al-Najjar, Mihkaʾil ʿAzzar, and Bishara Maʿluf. Hatem’s
colleague, Yusuf ʿAbdu, reported to al-Fatat newspaper that the church also gave them a
substantial cash donation for Syrian famine relief.62
Clergymen in both the Maronite and the Greek Orthodox rites sponsored recruitment
events and provided men such as Albert Hatem with space for their activities. The Orthodox
clergy took a particular interest in America’s war effort and circulated statements in support of
enlistment and its theological implications. Brooklyn’s Orthodox archbishop, Basilius Kher-
bawi, summed up his stance in al-Saʾih (The Traveller) newspaper in 1917: ‘The present war
has consumed the Christian world. Has it not been said to give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s,
and to God, what is God’s? … If a Christian is called to military service, he must give his
Figure 4. Albert Hatem, 1917. In 1918, Hatem was deployed to France with the 28th ‘Iron
Division’, where he was promoted to Sergeant. Source: Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 12.
62 Yusuf Jirjis ʿAbdu, ‘Murasilat: Atlanta Jurjya, 1 Disimbir (Letters: Atlanta, Georgia, 1 December)’, al-Fatat,
13 December 1917, p. 5.
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country what is asked of him.’63 The justness of America’s involvement provided additional
reason: ‘if the German nation and its Allies spread madness upon humanity, then isn’t it upon
every Christian to strike back at them for [the security of] their religion, civilization, and
humanity?’Archbishop Kherbawi endorsed ‘this recruitment campaign, and the Syrian Colony
of America [which] leads the charge’.64
The clergy’s involvement inﬂuenced the communal composition of Syrian immigrant
enlistees: the Légion d’Orient was widely seen as aMaronite project, while enlistment in the US
army stoked competition between Orthodox and Maronite leaders. But clerical support also
produced complaints that the mobilization effort served sectarian agendas, particularly among
émigré Sunnis and Druze, for whom continuing loyalty to the Ottoman empire’s ruling party
combined with a distrust of foreign ambitions in Syria.65 Their fears about sectarian discord
linked directly to larger anxieties about foreign (particularly French) interference in Ottoman
politics.66
The diaspora’s experience with military mobilization also created signiﬁcant political ﬁs-
sures between rival recruiters and among Syrian immigrant troops. The most common source
of conﬂict lay in recruiters’ preferences of foreign allies, as rival groups of Syrianists, Lebanists,
and Arab nationalists each sought to raise their proﬁle in Wilson’s army.67 In New York City,
Mukarzil’s Lebanon League of Progress was the only group promoting the Légion d’Orient,
but it also raised recruits for the US army andMukarzil invested much of his time in attempting
to cultivate American sympathies for Lebanese independence. Bakhash, the al-Fatat editor, by
contrast, promoted mobilization as a means of securing American support for the Arab
nationalist project of complete, immediate independence for a federated state including Syria,
Mount Lebanon, and Palestine. ‘The recruitment and deployment of ﬁghters (mujahidin) for
the Syrian cause’, he wrote in December 1917, was for ultimate liberation (al-tahrir al-nihaʾi)
from foreign occupation, Ottoman or otherwise.68 The city’s Syrianist organization, the Syria–
Mount Lebanon League of Liberation, promoted cooperation with the Americans to form a
constitutionalist state and ‘a useful member in the society of civilized peoples … under the
separate and direct protectorship of a democratic Christian nation’. Its president, Ayyub
Tabet, left the matter of Syria’s foreign protector open, a move which put his organization at
odds with Francophile Syrianist leaders such as Ghanim. Tabet also promoted the idea that
America could help reconstruct war-torn Syria. In the ﬁrst of many petitions to President
Wilson, he stated his preference for an American mandate over Syria, but conceded that ‘it is
our sincere belief that the United States may not care to assume [this] responsibility’.69
The intense political rivalries that burned between recruiters also culminated in acts of
sabotage. In 1917, Bakhash left New York for Argentina to promote the war to Syrian clubs in
63 Basilius Kherbawi, ‘Hal yajuz li-l-Masihiyi an yatajannad? (Are Christians obligated to enlist?)’, al-Saʾih, June
1917, reprinted in Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 116.
64 Ibid., p. 118.
65 NaʿumMukarzil, ‘Bayna al-Suriyyin: bi-ism al-Massih wa-l-Muhammad (Between Syrians: in the name of the
Messiah and Muhammad)’, al-Huda, 5 April 1916, p. 6; ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad, ‘Qatil bayna al-Suriyyin
(Killing among the Syrians)’, al-Saʾih, 6 April 1916, pp. 1–2.
66 On confessional politics, see Stacy Fahrenthold, ‘Transnational modes and media: the Syrian press in the
mahjar and emigrant activism duringWorldWar I’,Mashriq &Mahjar: Journal of Middle Eastern Migration
Studies, 1, 1, 2013, 40–1.
67 Hakim, Origins, pp. 1–13.
68 Bakhash, ‘Nahu Suriya’.
69 NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 381, 763.72119/1686, E. Tabet and Mikhail Naimy to President Wilson, 10May
1918. See also Ussama Makdisi, Faith misplaced: the broken promise of American–Arab relations,
1820–2001, New York: Perseus Books, 2010, pp. 136–46.
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Mendoza and San Martín. He quickly levied forty recruits, scheduled to accompany him back
toNewYork.70 Back in Brooklyn,Mukarzil took advantage of Bakhash’s absence to report his
newspaper, al-Fatat, to the US Postmaster General, Albert Burlson. A brash nativist, Burlson
had recently been empowered by America’s Espionage Acts of 1917 to censor the city’s ethnic
press.71 He required all foreign-language publications to remit regular English translations
to his ofﬁce for inspection, and al-Fatat’s failure to do so in Bakhash’s absence led to his
indictment for sedition, along with two colleagues, Ilya Abu Madi (also at al-Fatat) and
ʿAbd al-Massih Haddad (editor of al-Saʾih).72 Bakhash rushed home fromArgentina to sort out
the matter, leaving his recruits behind. He was later acquitted after Tabet prevailed on the
French ambassador, Jean Jusserand, to write the US Department of State on his behalf.73
Syrian and Lebanese immigrants who joined the US army were, without exception, sent to
France. Despite recruiters’ description of the European front as a valid theatre in the war against
the Ottomans, they faced ongoing pressure to facilitate the work of true auto-emancipation.
Returning from a recruitment trip to Brazil in late 1917, Bakhash concluded that ‘it is signiﬁcant
and important that Syrians may struggle for their own emancipation from the Turkish yoke’
rather than awaiting liberation at the hands of European powers.74 Syrian battle deaths in far-
away places such as the Somme and Château-Thierry weighed heavily on him. He feared that the
‘unacknowledged and uncounted disappearance’ of Syrian war dead in the mass carnage dis-
solved their symbolic signiﬁcance and undermined the political contract he believed Syrians had
made with America.75 Even as recruiters scoured the Americas looking for eligible young men,
they lobbied for two changes in army policy to enhance Syrians’ visibility: an end to the ﬁve-year
residency period, which discouraged some Syrian declarants from volunteering, and a reconsi-
deration of the US stance on irregular corps of co-ethnic immigrants.
Although the US army refused to loosen its eligibility requirements for foreign-born soldiers
in 1917, circumstances changed dramatically the following year. What had seemed like an
elegant classiﬁcation system dividing immigrants into declarants, non-declarants, and ineligi-
ble aliens instead proved to be a messy, unworkable albatross. Because the Selective Service Act
required all immigrant men to register despite their actual eligibility, hundreds of thousands of
ineligible aliens were mistakenly drafted into the army, among them thousands of Ottoman
subjects. Some ﬁled grievances through the foreign consular system; in the United States, the
Spanish Consulate handled exemption claims on behalf of Ottoman immigrants.76 But the
exemption process was difﬁcult and required drafted men to actively petition for exemption.
Exemption fraud also became a problem.77 If some immigrants used forged papers to claim
70 Tannus Yusuf Doumit and Shukri al-Bakhash, ‘al-Bakhash wa-l-mudaﬁʿin salafan (Bakhash and the ranks of
the defenders)’, al-Huda, 1 May 1917, p. 2.
71 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam wants you: World War I and the making of the modern American citizen,
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 152–9.
72 Naʿum Mukarzil, ‘Akhbar mahliyya: tajrim sihaﬁyyun (Local news: journalists indicted)’, al-Huda, 4 May
1917, p. 2.
73 NARA, RG 59, M367, roll 217, 763.72112/5267, Jean Jusserand to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State,
‘Memo 5267, on behalf of A. Tabet’, 24 October 1917.
74 Bakhash, ‘Nahu Suriya’.
75 Ibid.
76 NARA, RG 65.2.2, M1085, Investigative reports of the Bureau of Investigation, case no. 84061, Perkins,
‘Naoum Mokarzel—French Consul—Spanish Consul, alleged interference of Spanish Consul with Selective
Draft of Syrians in the United States’, 28 January 1918, pp. 16–17.
77 NARA, RG 65.2.2, M1085, roll 751, case no. 329549, Busha, ‘Alli Muharem, alleged representing himself as
Turkish consul’, 19 November 1918. See also ‘Gross frauds on draft suspected: follows arrest of Joseph
Solomon and Said Joseph’, Boston Daily Globe, 15 January 1918.
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exemption from the draft, many more opted to serve despite being legally ineligible; Nancy
Ford enumerates some 191,000 illegal US army enlistments by the war’s end.78
Meanwhile, ethnic leaders in several immigrant communities pushed for a loosening of
restrictions, and mainstream American nativists complained about ‘alien slackers’ who had
been excused frommilitary service.79 Congress revisited the issue of immigrant military service
in 1918, drafting a new law that waived the ﬁve-year residency requirement for immigrant
volunteers in the armed forces. The 9 May 1918 Act
entitles all aliens in the service (including enemy aliens) to citizenship whether they have
their ﬁrst papers or not … Before the application is granted, however, it should be
understood that the application is wholly voluntary and is a privilege which can only be
granted to those producing evidence of loyalty…When the application is granted, the
soldier will immediately become a citizen, with all privileges and immunities of
citizenship.80
This instantaneous citizenship was available only to immigrant soldiers, but regardless of
declarancy or nationality status. A single witness, usually the recruit’s commanding ofﬁcer,
was the army’s standard for ‘evidence of loyalty’. After signing a naturalization petition and a
loyalty oath renouncing their previous nationality, the soldiers proceeded to base camp as new
American citizens.81
The 9 May Act bolstered a new wave of enlistment enthusiasm among Syrian American
activists. The Syrian American Club had long focused on ‘forging ties of love and reconciliation
between the Syrians, assistance [to Syrians] in obtaining American citizenship, and the defense
of Syrian Americans from all classes in either of these endeavors’, but in summer 1918 it
sponsored dozens of new applications aimed at joint naturalization and enlistment.82 Its
recruiters in the Boston area, Wadiʿ Shakir and Ibrahim al-Khuri, promoted military service as
the best means of achieving American citizenship.
The recruitment process was almost invariably managed by newspaper editors and
other nationalist elites, but Syrian enlistees represented the full spectrum of the diaspora’s
working and middle classes. Most of the men whom Shakir and al-Khuri levied in 1918 were
textile workers from New England, and improved access to US citizenship appealed
more to Syrian proletarians than it did to the peddlers, merchants, and intellectuals who
dominate studies of the Syrian diaspora. A boom in the American textile industry just prior to
the war led many Syrian men into industrial weaving, leatherworking, and heavy manu-
facturing. Cash wages in these industries had reached an all-time high, but unnaturalized
Syrian workers also found themselves underpaid relative to naturalized immigrant workers.
First-time army privates earned only US$15 a month, a paltry sum compared to the US$25–30
that skilled textile workers made. But Syrian enlistees who fulﬁlled at least one term in the army
could then make use of their new citizenship status to obtain higher wages at the factories that
78 Ford, Americans all, p. 56.
79 See ‘Alien slackers may not escape service’, New York Times, 22 April 1917, p. 3; ‘Deportation of alien
slackers’, Christian Science Monitor, 1 August 1917, p. 1.
80 War Department organizational records, 77th Division records, Ofﬁce of the Chief of Staff, memorandum no.
79, 21 May 1918, cited in Ford, Americans all, p. 63.
81 Ford, Americans all, p. 64.
82 AANM, ES, Syrian American Club Records, 1, 6, Shukry Yusuf, ‘Syrian American Association bylaws’,
10 October 1914. See also Gualtieri, Between Arab and white, p. 85.
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employed them; those who stayed longer quickly advanced in rank, commanding monthly
salaries as high as US$50.83 The men who came to Shakir and al-Khuri did so in groups,
having resolved to join the army together on the shop ﬂoor.84 In one case, a shop foreman
named JurjMaʿtuq brought several employees from a Boston-area shoe factory.Maʿtuq was an
American citizen by virtue of birth; born in Boston to Syrian parents, he sponsored new
enlistment applications until his own deployment as an army translator in 1918. Maʿtuq’s
name also graces the naturalization papers for several Syrians (all leatherworkers) under the
9 May Act.85
The US army also revised its policies regarding ethnic corps in mid 1918. Historically the
Americans had resisted the use of irregular legions like the French Légion d’Orient because of
concerns about the diplomatic entanglements that such units could produce. An early effort to
levy an all-Syrian legion in Fall River, Massachusetts, failed to secure army approval. In this
small mill town in 1917, a naturalized army veteran named Mitri Jabbur raised an informal
column of 300 Syrian men running daily drills at the police academy. It is unclear whether Sgt
Jabbur had army authorization, but Fall River’s municipal authorities endorsed the project as a
show of immigrant patriotism. In his appeal to the US army’s Provost Marshall, Sgt Jabbur
stated that his goal was deployment to Mount Lebanon. Upon learning of the exercises,
General Crowder instead ordered the corps to be disbanded.86
Several immigrant groups lobbied for new ethnic corps in 1917, and the US army system-
atically denied these requests, typically referring them to one of America’s allies. Vladimir
Jabotinsky’s efforts to recruit American Jews for the ZionMule Corp (later the Jewish Legion)
are instructive. With volunteers from New York, Boston, and Chicago, Jabotinsky petitioned
for American sponsorship to bring the company to Palestine on behalf of Jewish settlers there.
President Wilson declined to support Jabotinsky’s project; instead, he obtained British
backing in 1917 and landed in Palestine with 10,000 recruits. Notably, half of the Jewish
Legion’s ﬁghters were American citizens granted service exemptions by the US government.87
Naturalized Syrian immigrants who served under the French ﬂag in the Légion d’Orient were
similarly exempted from the American draft.88
The 9 May 1918 Act prompted the US army to experiment with a variety of ethnic legions
for the ﬁrst time, changing the nature of immigrant mobilization as Syrians motivated by a
desire to renounce their Ottoman nationality and gain US citizenship joined in larger numbers.
In the summer of 1918, eight new battalions began training at Camp Devens in Massachu-
setts.89 The regiments – Italian, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Greek, Albanian, Syrian, and
Armenian – trained and spoke in their own languages and were comprised entirely of
83 War Department, ‘Rates of monthly pay for enlisted men’, Ofﬁcial Army register December 1 1918,
Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce, 1918, pp. 1138–9. Donald Cole, Immigrant city: Lawrence,
Massachusetts 1845–1921, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1963, p. 183.
84 AANM, ES, Syrian American Club Records, 1, 6, 1918.
85 See, for instance, NARA, RG 21, Records of the US District Court, M1368, roll 99, Petitions and records of
naturalizations of the U.S. District and Circuit Courts of the District of Massachusetts, Petition for natur-
alization of Peter Arthur Abraham, 9 May 1919.
86 Saʿab, ‘Hawl harakat al-tatawwuʿ al-wataniyya (About the national voluntary recruitment movement)’,
al-Huda, 5 May 1917, p. 5.
87 Ford, Americans all, pp. 37–9.
88 Tauber,Arabmovements, p. 201. Such was the case ofMelhamGeorge, investigated for draft evasion in 1918
but subsequently cleared because he was ‘ﬁghting the Turks in Palestine’with the French: NARA, RG 65.2.2,
M1085, roll 692, case 277009, Dunn, ‘Visa investigation, Melham Maroum George’, 30 August 1918.
89 ‘Organize “foreign legions” at Devens: War Ofﬁce experiments with new scheme’, Daily Boston Globe
17 August 1918.
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immigrants given naturalization in return for service.90 Sergeant James Habib ʿAttara, a lea-
therworker originally from Aleppo, presided over the Syrian column. ʿAttara’s group was
earmarked for France, but did not deploy because the war ended before they completed
training. The Syrian legion’s naturalization paperwork was so hastily drawn up (and so slowly
processed) that many of the men training under ʿAttara formally remained Ottoman subjects
until after the Armistice. Sgt ʿAttara’s own citizenship papers, for instance, were not processed
until 22 November 1918, two weeks after the end of the First World War.91
The hajj to break the German empire: Syrian soldiers on
the Western Front
Despite the recruitment obstacles that Ottoman immigrants faced, many Syrians and Lebanese
successfully enlisted and deployed to Europe under French, Canadian, British, and American
ﬂags. The Syrian press in the diaspora printed their images, biographies, and letters, eagerly
documenting Syrians on their ‘hajj to break the German empire’.92 A genre emerged that folded
soldiers’ stories into a pervasive narrative about Syrian liberation from abroad, ultimately serving
the ends of recruiters and a variety of émigré nationalists. But Syrian and Lebanese deployment
experiences illustrate a variety of responses to life in combat, undermining the conﬁdent patri-
otism imposed on them by the press abroad.Mounting casualties, the drudgery of trench life, and
brazen attempts by nationalists to appropriate the soldiers as symbols for their political projects
indelibly marked recruits’ perspectives of the war. For them, the simultaneity of ‘Syrian’ and
‘American’ patriotism – so important during the enlistment process – began to break down.
Writing home from the Western Front, deployed Syrians frequently reported their dis-
covery of compatriots on the battleﬁeld. Sometimes this was a source of glee: in late 1915,
Gabriel Ward reported to Ibrahim al-Khuri and the Fatat Boston newspaper that some of the
Syrians ﬁghting in Britain’s regiments were Ottoman draft-dodgers who had ﬂed Mount
Lebanon early in the war and ‘had been offered refuge in Britain’ in return for their service.93
Though few in numbers, Ottoman army deserters who joined the Entente gave the Syrian press
a powerful symbol for émigré partnerships against Istanbul. Discussions about the empire’s
eroding military morale accompanied images of Syrian troops and advertisements calling for
recruits.94 To encounter an Ottoman deserter in Europe was not typical, however; the British
principally employed them in the Hejaz, working as saboteurs with Emir Faysal’s Arab
forces.95 But Syrian troops stationed in Europe often met other Syrians blended together in
infantry units from across the diaspora in ways that facilitated new discussions about what it
meant to be ‘Syrian’, ‘Lebanese’, or ‘Arab’ as opposed to ‘Ottoman’ in the context of war.
90 Laurence Winship, ‘Camp Devens foreign legion presents a Babel of tongues: Slav and Italian and Greek and
Armenian, but all Americans at heart’, Daily Boston Globe, 25 August 1918, p. 32.
91 NARA, RG 21, Records of the US District Court, M1368, roll 99, Petitions and records of naturalizations of
the U.S. District and Circuit Courts of the District of Massachusetts, Petition for naturalization of James
Habib Attara, 22 November 1918.
92 Ward, Kitab al-Jundi al-Suri, p. 112.
93 Ibid., p. 101.
94 Beşikçi, Ottoman mobilization, p. 259.
95 NARA, RG 59, M 367, roll 381, 763.72119/1707, William Yale to Leland Harrison, Department of State,
‘Report #2 dealing with Arabia and Hedjaz situation’, 5 November 1917, pp. 18–19. See also Beşikçi,
Ottoman mobilization, pp. 257–64; Eugene Rogan, The fall of the Ottomans: the Great War in the Middle
East, New York: Basic Books, 2015, pp. 302–5.
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Although ‘Syrian’ identity had carried a speciﬁc ethnic content and legal value in the Americas
since the late 1890s, the experience of mobilization of Syrian co-ethnics promoted political
identiﬁcations as ‘Syrian’ or ‘Lebanese’, with increasingly nationalist trappings.
Writing to New York’s al-Huda newspaper in 1917, Ward described an afternoon in a
London café known as a haunt for Syrian soldiers. Sipping coffee with a group of uniformed
Syrian Christians, he was discussing Mount Lebanon’s famine when the café owner, a Muslim
named Saʿid who identiﬁed as a supporter of Emir Faysal’s Arab Revolt, inserted himself into
the group: ‘the famine, the war; they are all signs of God’s wrath’. Ward replied, ‘the wrath of
God, as you say, or that of Government?’ The coffeemaker interjected, ‘God curse the
Unionists [the Committee of Union and Progress, Istanbul’s ruling party]… noMuslim starves
or hangs his people’; noticing the men’s uniforms, he asked if they were ‘those men recruited by
the Lebanon League of Progress?’96 Ward denied this but voiced his support for Mukarzil’s
campaign as a means of ‘Syrian and Lebanese emancipation’. Ward’s distinction of ‘Syrian’
from ‘Lebanese’ reﬂected the diaspora’s emerging nationalist idioms, but it was a distinction
that Hashimite Arab nationalists and the majority of Ottoman Syria’s inhabitants sharply
rejected.97 Unimpressed by Ward, Saʿid made his appeal for pan-Arab unity against the
Ottoman state,
Brother, after this war we will all be together, not as ‘Syrian’ or ‘Lebanese’. Please, I ask
you to pass on my words to every colony and corner of your diaspora: that they are not
Christian, nor Lebanese, nor Syrian. All of us are Arabs in a Turkish house…we are all
under a single shadow, and no work can be done [about it] unless we do it together.98
Among soldiers, the experience of recruitment, enlistment, and deployment effectively changed
what it meant to be ‘Syrian’ or ‘Lebanese’ as opposed to Ottoman subjects abroad. By 1918,
new national signiﬁers took on increasingly more rigid ideological content.
At the same time, soldiers’writings betrayed a countervailing resistance to nationalist ideas,
as well as a mounting belief among the men that the war would destroy, not create, new
nations. The war’s global character and theWestern Front’s massive mortality alienated Syrian
troops from the nationalist goals reported by activists abroad. In his memoirs, Ward recounted
the combat death of a close companion from his regiment, Jibraʾil Bishara from Mount
Lebanon. Ward and Bishara had travelled together from New York to Canada to enlist in
1915. Ward recalled his eagerness to ‘to complete the salvation of Syrians and Lebanese from
the suffering of this war’ as they arrived in northern France in January 1916.99 Bishara had
been ‘the ﬁrst to charge into the battleﬁeld’, where he instantly sustained a mortal shrapnel
wound to the neck. As he lay dying in a ﬁeld hospital, his ﬁnal thoughts were taken down by
Ward. These he sent to the Syrian newspapers of New York:
you listen to me, dear Gabriel, do not risk yourself recklessly as I have, for my prize will
be that I die in this strange, foreign place, without seeing my family, my friends, or my
neighbours once more. Write to them in themahjar [diaspora] and tell them how I have
been killed. Tell them that I have gone in martyrdom back to my homeland, where I pray
96 Gabriel Ilyas Ward, ‘Hadith al-Muslim (A discussion with a Muslim)’, al-Huda, 11 May 1917, p. 5.
97 Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks, pp. 174–202; Çiçek, War and state formation, pp. 39–63.
98 Ward, ‘Hadith al-Muslim’.
99 Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, p. 10.
108 j S T A C Y D . F A H R E N T H O L D
there will soon rise a liberated Syria and Lebanon, free from the nations of Genghis
Khan.100
Bishara’s words raise a curious blend of notions of martyrdom for the cause of national
liberation with his doubts about ﬁghting Syria’s war from the wrong side of the world.
His complaint took aim at a central promise made by émigré recruiters: that Syrian soldiers
ﬁghting anywhere contributed to their homeland’s independence. Mailing the declaration to
al-Huda and al-Shaʿb (The People) newspapers, Ward noted with bitter irony that Bishara’s
death (not his deployment) delivered him home. Some months later, trench life exposed Ward
to toxic gas, depriving him of sight in one eye and the use of his left hand. He was reassigned to
London, where he worked as an intelligence ofﬁcer monitoring the city’s Syrian periodicals,
ethnic societies, and cafes for ‘pro-German sympathies’ (and it was in this work that he
encountered Saʿid, the Arab nationalist café owner).101 Ward also promoted recruitment for
the Légion d’Orient and to the Ottoman fronts generally.102
Ward’s later dispatches to al-Huda illustrated his mounting frustration with the suffering
he encountered on the European front. In 1917, he described a meeting with an Ottoman
deserter hiding out in France. The man ‘had death in his eyes. He had witnessed true alienation
and had a severe, strained countenance’ as he asked Ward for help in joining the French
infantry. Ward reported that, when he asked why he wished to join the Allies, the deserter
chillingly replied ‘Are we not all alienated? Are we not, all of us, ﬁghting together? As this war
heaps ever greater numbers of us, corpses and ﬂeeing soldiers, atop one another, we shed our
contrasting colours and are joined in mutual fear.’103 If Ward had described Bishara’s death as
a sort of national homecoming in 1916, this exchange comes to a grimmer conclusion: mor-
tality as the means by which men cast off their nationalist raiment and are ground back into an
undifferentiated, suffering humanity.
Back on the American home front, Syrian newspapers were undeterred. They continued to
celebrate the community’s deployed troops and facilitated the ongoing recruitment efforts of
their editors. But soldiers’ experiences abroad differed signiﬁcantly from the expectations of
émigré nationalists, producing moments of intense friction when the latter appropriated
recruits as nationalist symbols. After enlisting with a group of Syrian leatherworkers in Boston,
Jurj Maʿtuq deployed to northern France in 1918, working as a translator for the 101st
Engineer Corps. Once abroad, he wrote home to Fatat Boston to request that the immigrant
community send care packages to his deployed compatriots.104 The newspaper featured
Maʿtuq’s note on page 1, with the biographies of ‘entrenched Syrians’ on theWestern Front.105
Its editor, Wadiʿ Shakir, also wrote a full-page editorial applauding Maʿtuq and plugging his
Syrian American Club recruitment work. ‘We Syrians’, Shakir began,
100 Ibid., p. 122. Bishara’s derisive terminology, ‘the nations of Genghis Khan’ (al-dawla al-jankiziyya), was a
common soldier’s idiom referring to the German forces. In Syrian usage the epithet also captured notions
about the Ottomans as Turkish hordes.
101 AANM, ES, Syrian American Club Records, 1, 5, Gabriel Ward to Syrian American Club of Boston,
23 November 1918; Ward, Kitab al-Jundi al-Suri, p. 70.
102 ‘Ahad jabarat al-Suriyyun (One powerful Syrian)’, Abu al-Hawl, May 1917, and ‘Jundi yadaʿu al-Suriyyin
wa-l-Lubnaniyyin ila-l-tatawwuʿ (A soldier calls on Syrians and Lebanese to volunteer)’, al-Huda, May
1917, reproduced in Ward, Kitab al-jundi al-Suri, pp. 125–9.
103 Ward, ‘ʿAr an la-tasil damaʾuna illa ʿala khanja al-saffah’.
104 NARA, RG 147, M2097, roll 185, Selective registration cards, World War II, no. 1753, fourth registration
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We grow up abhorring the military lifestyle, andwe live timid lives in fear and bitterness.
Then there are those of us who go to service and face a world of death. Those feelings of
fear and timidity are in the hearts of every young Syrian because of the Turkish
government’s brutality, of shortages and starvation … [but] they can draw on these
hatreds to ﬁght off eons under the Turkish yoke.106
Shakir left no room for ambiguity: these soldiers were engaged in a battle against the Ottoman
state on behalf of Syrians around the world. He probably thought that Maʿtuq would approve
of his narrative; instead, Maʿtuq was outraged.
Upon reading about his unit in Fatat Boston, Maʿtuq penned a second, deeply critical letter
to Shakir and the Syrian American Club in June 1918. As a Syrian American, he saw himself as
principally engaged in ‘a ﬁght to the end for the stars and stripes, that ﬂag of liberty and
democracy’.107 He resented his name being attached to a discussion of homeland politics, and
he felt that Shakir had capitalized on the lives of his fellow soldiers:
You are acting as Americans, in America, [but] are you really Americans, or are you only
Americans for your busnis [sic]? I just wonder what your idea was in taking our name,
our company’s name and regiment address. I gust [sic, ‘guessed’] it was so you could
remembre [sic] us when we die. Or was it to write to each other and attach your club to
us, same as all the other [immigrant] clubs? I would just like to ﬁnd out… what kind of
Americans you really are. We [are] in France doing our bit, what are you fellows
doing?108
Maʿtuq invoked what he saw as the fundamental distinction between Syrian soldiers and the
émigré nationalists responsible for recruiting so many of them. For the nationalists, soldiers
were a symbol of Syria’s liberation and redemption. For Maʿtuq, by contrast, they were agents
of liberation: ‘We [are] not ﬁghters only where we [were] born but we are ﬁghting for Syria too
and Liberty. God is leading us to Liberty, bearing our ﬂag on his Right and France on his left,
heading us towards Liberty and home.’Maʿtuq had little patience with the elite nationalists of
the pen, and he closed his letter with a challenge to Shakir to write to deployed Syrians, rather
than about them in the press: ‘even if they are not a member of your club, they are your own
nationality, your kind, the same as the Italian, the Jew, and the Polish … why should we let
somebody else [be] better than us?’109
Ironically, Maʿtuq’s multilayered patriotism – as simultaneously ‘Syrian’ and ‘American’ –
had already started to fall out of style among nationalist elites such as Shakir in favour of
programmatic nationalist agendas concerned with the ‘Syrian Question’, Wilsonian self-
determination, and the emergence of new national borders on the Middle Eastern map. The
recruitment of emigrants had depended on a ﬂexible, multi-layered patriotism appealing to
desires for both Syrian liberation and American inclusion, but the post-war movement would
depend on unambiguous claims to national territories, histories, and identities. At the precise
moment that Syrian soldiers expressed their frustrations with the limitations of nationalist
discourse, activists abroad promoted these same nationalisms to policymakers in the Entente.
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Conclusion
The First World War ended in the Ottoman empire’s defeat in October 1918, and with Syria’s
occupation by British, French, and Arab troops. The League of Nations announced that it
would preside over the post-war settlement process at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and
dozens of émigré recruiters-turned-nationalists shifted focus from mobilizing the diaspora’s
military manpower to harnessing its representative voice through extensive petition
campaigns.110 In their production, circulation, and presentation to the Great Powers, petitions
on the ‘Syrian Question’ followed the same routes that once delivered Syrian troops to enlist-
ment centres. Often, these documents passed through the same networks of men whose hands
had stamped foreign passports, drawn up naturalization papers, and provided steamship
tickets to emigrant troops one year earlier.
Military mobilization in the Syrian diaspora began in 1916, with the French campaign to
enlist migrants into the Légion d’Orient. The French campaign provided a highly visible model
for transnational recruitment which Syrian émigrés employed with larger success later, as the
United States of America entered the war in 1917. Thousands of Syrians and Lebanese from
both North and South America, many of them recent Ottoman nationals, enlisted in the United
States army. Their recruitment required the construction of sophisticated networks of men to
solicit manpower, challenge the legal ambiguities that foreign nationals faced, and negotiate
the terms of enlistment, deployment, and citizenship for Syrian soldiers. Starting in 1916 with
French efforts to train a Syrian ethnic corps, recruitment of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants
fostered new patterns of migration between the diaspora’s outposts in North and South
America. Recruits could be ﬁltered through French, Canadian, and American channels on the
basis of recruiters’ political loyalties, soldiers’ citizenship or confessional status, opportunities
for naturalization, or choice of active fronts. Formany recruits, service under the American ﬂag
was preferable, especially after the 9May 1918Act offered instantaneous American citizenship
to Syrian volunteers.
Through a fragmentary archival record and the reportage from the Arabic press, this article
has captured what Syrian diasporic mobilization looked like from the inside, through the eyes
of recruiters and their emigrant charges. It has argued that the mobilization effort depended on
a ﬂexible, multivalent discourse about patriotism, responsibility, and obligation that spoke to
emigrants as both Syrians andAmericans. Recruiters built into their workwith the US army the
expectation that the use of Syrian troops would lead to an American endorsement of Syrian
aspirations for independence. In the end, these expectations were sorely frustrated: an emigrant
bid for a US mandate over Syria and Lebanon failed to capture the attentions of American
policymakers, and France prepared the ground to impose a League of Nations mandate in
1920.111 As for the Syrian immigrant veterans who served, most of them secured American
citizenship but maintained a ﬂuid, situational political identity: simultaneously Syrian and
American, and as migrants with familial, commercial, and affective ties to the new states of
110 On petitions, see Susan Pedersen, The guardians: the League of Nations and the crisis of empire, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015; Hakim, Origins, pp. 213–60; Arsan, ‘This age’, p. 137; Jackson, ‘Diaspora
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Wheatley, ‘Mandatory interpretation: legal hermeneutics and the new international order in Arab and
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Syria and Lebanon. Homogeneous, exclusive concepts of national identiﬁcation – Syrian, or
Lebanese, or American but never all of these – had never much suited them.
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